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THE SURPRISING FINDING THAT "CULTURAL WORLDVIEWS"
DON'T EXPLAIN PEOPLE'S VIEWS ON GUN CONTROL
GERTRUD M. FREMI.NG' &.JOHN R. LOTTJR."
Using the General Social Survey, Kahan and Braman show that "cultural
worldviews" only explain about 1.6 percentage points of people'S views on gun
control. Assuming that their indexes properly measure these "cultural world-
views, " the results are very striking and surprising. In addition, 92 % of the
variation in people's views isn't even explained when all the fitctors that they ar
count for are included. While they don't test the hypothesis, it is very conceivable
that some of the 92% can be explained by what information people receive. If so,
the returns to research could be quite large.
INTRODUCTION
Do people's values and political perspectives influence their posi-
tions on gun control? Certainly, there is no doubt about it. But facts
must also matter. To say that only people's values matter seems oddly
circular, because it fails to explain the origin of these values. If values
do not come from facts that we encounter-either through our own
experiences, those we learn from other individuals, or from more evi-
dence of a scientific nature-where would they come from? Are val-
Lies the result of pure randomness? Not likely. There must be some
contributing factors. Are values the result of innate human instinct?
Possibly some. But if one were to argue that attitudes originate from
religion, politics, or moral philosophy, would not these attitudes ulti-
mately originate from the perceptions held by prophets, politicians,
and philosophers? And these perceptions would not be based on rea-
son alone, but on these individuals' experiences as well as on experi-
ences and facts related to them by other individuals.
While Kahan and Braman's article focuses on gun control, their
claim that empirical work is of little value' must surely apply to other
issues. Yet, the importance of facts in altering views seems undeni-
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able. Surely the failure of communism and its fall in the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe affected views on government ownership
of production. Today few economists deny that price controls cause
shortages . The vast majority also believe that increasing the money
supply is the primary reason for inflation. ' The consensus is so over-
whelming today that it is hard to remember how contested these ideas
werejust four or five decades ago."
Scientific discoveries reflect another form of empirical work that
has obviously revolutionized our thinking about the universe and the
place and role humans occupy. Science has generated much bigger
upheavals than mere "attitudes" about social issues. For example, as
evidence gathered that the Earth circled the sun, we could no longer
view ourselves as being the center of the universe. Likewise, the con-
cept of evolution and the evidence behind it profoundly changed our
views on hurnan nature itself.
Kahan and Braman should be lauded for attempting to provide
empirical evidence using data obtained from the General Social Sur-
vey (GSS). Data gathering and statistical analysis should be done
more, not less, frequently. Of course, that is our perspective. The
irony is that they try to use empirical evidence to show that empirical
evidence doesn't matter.
If found correct, their bold hypothesis would surely shake up aca-
demia and political debate. Philosophy and religion, which are more
heavily based on reasoning and ethics, would increase in prominence,
while economics and, in particular, statistics would become less rele-
vant. Unfortunately for them, their results do not support their
claims. Indeed, as we demonstrate, Kahan and Braman's results show
the very opposite of what they hope.
A survey of economists in 1990, for example, indicated that 93% either "agree"
or "generally agree" that "[a] ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of hous-
ing available." Richard M. Alston et al., Is There a Consensus Among Economists in the
1990s?, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 203, 204 tbl.l (1992).
A survey of economisLs in 1990 indicated that 70% either "agree" or "generally
agree" that "[i] nflation is primarily a monelary phenomenon." Id. at 204.
See MILTON FRIEDMAN & GEORGEJ. STIGLER, ROOFS OR CEILINGS? TIlE CURRENT
HOUSING PROBLEM (1946) (explaining the overlooked idea that price ceilings are the
cause of housing shortages); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN
MONETARY HIsTORY 193-204 (1992) (dispelling traditionally advanced explanations
that nonmiomnetary phenomena stIch as business greed, international economic forces,
and low productivity are caIses of inlflation).
SUP ISING FINI)ING
I. THEIR EVIDENCE
Kahan and Braman reach two closely related conclusions: (1)
"individuals' attitudes toward gun control are derivative of the type of
social order they prize"; r and (2) "those interested in resolving the
gun debate should turn their attention away from quantifying the
consequences of gun control."'' These conclusions are based on the
two regressions reported in Table 1 of their article
Their reasoning points to the statistically significant coefficients
that they obtain for their "hierarchy-egalitarianism" and "individual-
ism-solidarism" indexes.8 They are indeed correct that these coeffi-
cients are statistically significant. But statistical significance is not the
same as importance: it is incorrect to claim that these variables ex-
plain much of people's views on gun control. The indexes developed
by Kahan and Braman increase our ability to predict people's opin-
ions on gun control by merely 1.6 percentage points (the difference
in the two R s, equal to .08 minus .064, representing the change in
how much of the variation in people's opinions on gun control can be
explained by adding these two variables)." In other words, cultural at-
titudes explain less than 2% of attitudes on guns. (Our guess is that if
Kahan and Braman's data set allowed a more precise control of state-
or area-code-fixed effects, they would find an even smaller percentage
of the variation explained by their two desired control variables, and
the statistical significance might well drop too.) Thus, Kahan and
Braman prove the opposite of what they intended. Instead of demon-
strating that people's views of social order explain a lot of the varia-
tion in positions on gun control, they show that these views matter
very little.
Possibly, the unexplained 92% of the variation in people's views
(the remainder after factoring the .08 R2 variable reflecting people's
opinions on gun control that can be explained) could be completely
due to randomness. Yet, it is very conceivable that some of the 92%
figure could be explained by what information people receive. The
central problem here is that Kahan and Braman actually do not test
5 Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1323.
1 M. at 1324 (emphasis omitted).
7 Id. at 1306 tbl. 1.
See id. at 1302-04 (describing the hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-
solidarism scales and the inclinations of survey respondents each scale aims to meas-
tire).
!) I. at 1306 tbl. 1.
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whether information matters. They test whether attitudes matter.
Obviously, there is no logic that rules out that both matter.
To solve this problem, they need a measure of what information
people receive. Perhaps they could include a dummy variable such as
whether or not respondents have read More Guns, Less Crime,' seen
certain news shows, or seen some major news event. If we identify a
reasonable variable of that nature and show it to be statistically signifi-
cant, then we can conclude that information matters. At that point,
we could compare relative magnitudes: does the influence stemming
from "attitudes" exceed that stemming from "information"? (Unfor-
tunately, the task would probably encounter great complexity due to
collinearity between the two explanatory variables-the information
channels we seek out also depend on our preexisting attitudes.)
However, without showing the statistical significance of information,
its importance remains unknown.
Another theoretical problem we have with Kahan and Braman's
conclusions is their lack of consideration for the potential of empirical
evidence to determine whether gun control helps people obtain their
social goals. For example, suppose that research showed that gun
ownership was consistent with egalitarianism. Right-to-carry laws allow
the most vulnerable in society to protect themselves: those most vul-
nerable to crime (the poor who live in high crime urban areas); the
physically weak (women and the elderly); and those who face racial or
other hatreds (African Americans and homosexuals).' These are the
exact segments of society for which egalitarians exhibit concern."
Even if people only care about social values, don't they care about
whether the regulations that they propose help them obtain their
goals?
See generlayJOHN R. LOYIFJR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (2d ed. 2000) (present-
ing evidence indicating that gun control does not save lives).II
See id. at 183-84 ("[T]hose who are relatively weaker physically (women and the
elderly) and those who are most likely to be crime victims (blacks and those living in
rban areas) tend to benefit the most from the passage of right-to-carry laws."). For a
discussion of the gener-al beneficial protections of right-to-carry laws, see id. at 97-116.
12 ee Kahan & Braman, supra note I, at 1303 (defining egalitarianism as in "oppo-
sition to social differentiation and ... toleran[t] of deviance").
SURPIUSING FINDING
II. WHAT IS ECONOMICS?
Kahan and Braman dismiss economics on a couple of fronts, both
on the grounds that incentives don't matter" as well as for economics'
supposed inability to explain how people's views change (or how peo-
ple learn) .
A. Do Incentives Matter?
[If] individuals behave like rational utility maximizers ..... one would
expect variation in violent crime-and hence variation in the likelihood
that guns will be used for violent purposes-to explain a substantial
amount of the variation in attitudes toward gun 
control.1"
This problem is more complicated than discussed here by Kahan
and Braman. Whether increased crime rates could lower or increase
support for gun control depends upon individuals' conceptions of the
relationship between gun control and crime. With people holding
both views, it is not clear which effect will dominate or even that there
will be an effect systematic enough to be statistically significant.
Yet it seems indisputable that, in general, incentives matter.
Whether the question involves the deterrence of criminals through
higher arrest and conviction rates, longer prison sentences, or increas-
ing penalties, they all deter criminals. "' This is also proven by the dif-
ferent international rates of so-called "hot burglaries," where residents
1' See id. at 1312 (questioning the impact of empirical information-for example,
information concerning crime rates and the deterrent value of gun ownership-on
attitudes toward gun control).
14 See id. at 1312-14 (criticizing economic hypotheses accounting for how individu-
als weigh evidence and thus draw conclusions from it).
I Id. at 1312.
16 For some recent articles discussing the deterrent effects of gun ownership, see
William Alan Bartley & Mark A. Cohen, The lffect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme
Bound Analysis, 36 ECON. INQUIR 258, 258-59 (1998); Stephen G. Bronars & John R.
Lott, Jr., Criminal Deterrence, Geographic Spillovers, and Rightto-Cary Laws, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 475, 475 (1998);John R. Lott,Jr. &John E. Whitley, Safe-Storage Gun Laws: Acci-
dental Deaths, Suicides, and Crime, 44J.L. & ECON. 659, 677-81 (2001); Tomas B. Marvell,
The hnpact of BanningJivenile Gun Possession, 44J.L. & ECON. 691, 700-11 (2001); Car-
lisle E. Moody, Testing for the Effects of Concealed WeaI)ons Laws: Specification Errors and
Robustness, 44J.L. & ECON. 799, 802-04 (2001); David B. Mustard, The Impact of Gun
Laws on Police Deaths, 44J.L. & ECON. 635, 648-49 (2001); David E. Olson & Michael D.
Maltz, Right-to-Cany Concealed Weapon Laws and Homicide in Large U.S. Counties: The lf
fect on Weapon Types, Victim Characteristics, and Victim-Offender Relationships, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 747, 758-67 (2001); Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, Does Right to
Carry Concealed Handguns Deter Cointable Crimes? Ouiy a Count Analysis Can Say, 44J.L.
& ECON. 771, 783-88 (2001).
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are at home when the criminals strike. 7 Fifty-nine percent of the bur-
glaries in Britain, which has tough gun control laws, are "hot burgla-
ries."': By contrast, the United States, with laxer restrictions, has a
hot-burglary rate of only 13%.'' Consistent with this, surveys of con-
victed felons in America reveal that during burglaries they are much
more worried about encountering armed victims than they are about
running into the police.2" This fear of potentially armed victims
causes American burglars to spend more time than their foreign
counterparts "casing" a house to ensure that nobody is home. Felons
frequently comment in these interviews that they avoid late-night bur-
glaries because "that's the way to get shot.
2'
Also, despite the suggestions of Kahan and Braman " people do
indeed respond to the specific threat of crime with respect to gun atti-
tudes and behavior. Individuals living in more crime-prone commu-
nities, as well as individuals who have used guns in the past for self-
defense, are more likely to store their guns unlocked and loaded!'
B. Can Economics Explain How People Learn?
[T]he "rational weigher" hypothesis seems to beg the most important
question: what. detennines how much weight individuals assign to any
given piece of evidence . .
Economics has a lot to say about how people learn. The same
tools economics uses to explain why criminals commit fewer crimes as
deterrence increases apply equally to learning patterns. We offer two
17 For example, Kopel provides international evidence on hot-burglary rates. See
David B. Kopel, Lawyers, Guns, and Biuglas', 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 345, 361 (2001) (finding
that the "American violent crime rate is significantly lower... because American bur-
glars are much less likely than Canadian burglars to enter an occupied home").
Id. at 348.
I /d. at 360.
2o JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER Ff. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERE) DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FFLONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 145 (1986).
2.James Wright and Peter Rossi interviewed felony prisoners in ten state correc-
tional systems and found that 56% said that criminals would not attack a potential vic-
tim known to be armed, Id. They also found evidence that criminals in those states
with the highest levels of civilian gun ownership worried the most about armed victims.
Id. at 151.
22 See Kahan & Branan, supra note 1, at 1312 ("[N]either actual crime rates, per-
ceived crime rates, prior victimization, nor fear of victimization strongly correlates with
public opinion toward gun control.").
230 IN R. Lo',, TuE BIAs AGAINST GUNS 176 (2003).
24 Kahan & Braman, sIupra note I, at 1312 (emphasis omitted).
SURIPRISIN(; FINDING
examples. First, economics maintains that as the cost of accessing and
absorbing different types of information, the types of views and values
held by people also change. The principle even explains how and why
governments in many countries have gone to great lengths to control
the information that citizens receive, e.g., through schooling and
through the media. Second, economics recognizes that individuals
conceptually experience difficulty setting up causal hypotheses.2 1
Many people fail to notice certain regularities, something that in past
work we have labeled "the bias toward zero.",
Of course, even if people do not fully appreciate factual relation-
ships, as we just argued, it could still be possible that people almost ex-
clusively rely on fact, however imperfect. Furthermore, as a corollary
point, people's possible reliance on fact suggests that basic attitudes in
other respects do not matter all that much (or can be explained, in
turn, by facts in other areas).
Reality is a dynamic, complicated process, and it is very likely that
attitudes are, in some sense, "important" in explaining how people
act. This assertion is difficult to prove statistically. The open ques-
tion, which really was not tested in Kahan and Braman's article, is
whether experiences and facts also play a role and whether these are
even more important than the cultural attitudes they exalt.
CONCLUSION
It is very interesting that Kahan and Braman find that attitudes on
guns are so little explained by attitudes in other areas. Merely 1.6
percentage points of attitudes toward gun control can be attributed to
attitudes in other areas. This is surprising since the gun debate is
typically viewed as politically polarized, as a right-wing versus left-wing
issue. But, perhaps, many issues are simply defined in the media by
- Seejohn R. LottJr., An Explanation for Public Provision qf.Schooling: The hmportance
of Indoctination, 33 J.L. & ECON. 199, 201 (1990) (arguing that "schooling lowers the
cost of wealth transf'ers hy instilling the right views"); John R. Lott,Jr., Public Schooling,
Indoctrination, and Totalitatianisin, 107J. POL. ECON. S127, S128 (1999) (claiming that
"[g]overnmentLs have gone to great lengths to instill desired values in children," and
exploring "the characteristics of governments that have the greatest returns to indoc-
trination, are more likely to own the media, and are in fact making larger investments
in public education").
21 See Gertrud M. Fremling & John R. Lott, Jr., The Bias Toward Z7ro in Identijying
Rlationships: Reply to Kennedy, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 385, 385 (1999) ("Individual actors
are sometimes quite clueless as to an economic problem, failing to understand that two
(or more) variables are related.").
27 Id.
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what organizations carry what messages. The views by any given indi-
vidual might be less "coherent" across issues than are the views pre-
sented by a particular organization.
We think Kahan and Braman should revise their conclusion and
take credit for this interesting finding.
